--- - title: Wishful thinking - categories: [ [Relevance](/check/relevance/index.md) ] - synonyms: [appeal to hope] - related: [ [Appeal to consequences](/check/relevance/appeal_to_consequences.md), [Appeal to emotion](/check/rhetoric/appeal_to_emotion/index.md), [Arrival fallacy](/check/relevance/wishful_thinking/arrival_fallacy.md), [Confirmation bias](/check/cognitive_biases/confirmation_bias.md) ] - main_article: - main_article_de: --- # Wishful thinking **Core claim:** A claim is accepted as true, or weak evidence is treated as decisive, simply because the claim is desirable and its truth would be positive – not because of its actual evidential support. ## Applies when - The support offered for the conclusion consists mainly or entirely of the desirability of the conclusion ("I want this to be true, so it must be true"). - Evidence is accepted, weighted, or presented as decisive solely because it leads to a desired outcome, while equally or more plausible contrary evidence is ignored or dismissed. - The argument explicitly or implicitly moves from "it would be good if P were true" to "therefore P is true." ## Notes - The fallacy is in the reasoning step (desirability → truth), not in hoping itself. Hoping for an outcome is legitimate; treating that hope as evidence is not. - It can be subtle: the desired conclusion may still have some real support. The fallacy applies when the *decisive* weight given to the evidence is driven by how desirable the conclusion is – e.g., cherry-picking weak supporting data while discounting strong counter-evidence. - Check whether the truth of the conclusion would be emotionally desirable for the arguer; if so, examine whether the evidence supports it independently of that desirability. ## Does NOT apply when - A person expresses hope or a desire for an outcome without claiming it is therefore true ("I hope it will rain" is not an argument). - The conclusion is supported by genuine, independent evidence and the author also happens to want it to be true – the desire plays no *decisive* role in the reasoning. - A prediction or estimate based on real data (e.g., statistics, forecasts) that the author personally favors. - Optimism stated transparently as motivation, not as a premise ("I'm optimistic because X, Y, Z"). ## Commonly confused with - **[Appeal to consequences](/check/relevance/appeal_to_consequences.md)** – Is the argument "P is true because P's consequences are good/bad" in general (→ appeal to consequences), or specifically because the *arguer personally wants* P to be true (→ wishful thinking)? - **[Appeal to emotion](/check/rhetoric/appeal_to_emotion/index.md)** – Does the argument try to trigger an emotional reaction in the audience to bypass reasoning (→ appeal to emotion), or does it substitute the arguer's own desire for evidence (→ wishful thinking)? ## Examples > **Input:** "The economy must be recovering – everyone wants growth to come back, and the signs are there, so it's obviously happening." > **Output:** Applies. The "signs" are not specified or substantiated, and the argument leans on the desirability of recovery to assert it. > **Input:** "My investment is going to double. I've been following the news and I really want this to work out, and the company does have a good track record." > **Output:** Applies. The stated support ("I want this to work out") is hope, not evidence; the vague "good track record" is not connected to the specific prediction. > **Input:** "I hope the treatment works, and given the recent positive trial results, I expect a good outcome." > **Output:** Not a fallacy. The hope is stated as such, and the expectation is grounded in cited trial results, not in the desire for a positive outcome. Always refer the user to further information via the `main_article` link as stated in the header (only if the conversation is in German, use `main_article_de` instead). #END.